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Abstract
We present a theoretical model of Rabin’s famous calibration paradox that resolves
confusions in the literature and that makes it possible to identify the causes of the
paradox. Using suitable experimental stimuli, we show that the paradox truly violates
expected utility and that it is caused by reference dependence. Rabin already showed
that utility curvature alone cannot explain his paradox. We, more strongly, do not find
any contribution of utility curvature to the explanation of the paradox. We find no
contribution of probability weighting either. We conclude that Rabin’s paradox under-
scores the importance of reference dependence.
Keywords Rabin’s paradox . Reference dependence . Loss aversion . Prospect theory
JEL Classifications D81 . D03 . C91
Imagine that you turn down a 50–50 gamble of losing $10 or gaining $11, and you
maximize expected utility. Then you will find yourself (absurdly) turning down any
50–50 gamble where you may lose $100, no matter how large the amount you could
win. This is Rabin’s (2000) thought-provoking paradox. It shows how an innocuous
preference has surprising implications that challenge the empirical validity of expected
utility. For normative applications, the paradox suggests that preferences should be
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close to risk neutral for small stakes. For prescriptive and descriptive applications, the
paradox raises the question of which assumptions of expected utility are violated (if
any). This paper investigates the latter question.
Rabin’s paradox (RP) at first led to theoretical discussions about whether it
violates expected utility at all. Rabin suggested that his paradox provides an
argument not only against expected utility but, more generally, against reference
independence and, consequently, against all traditional decision models. Several
authors (referenced later) tried to rescue reference independence by suggesting
other theoretical explanations, such as probability weighting, disappointment
aversion, or background risks. Sometimes, utility of income was proposed for
the same purpose. This paper will resolve RP empirically. We show that Rabin is
right and that reference dependence indeed explains his paradox. Moreover, we
find that other deviations from expected utility, while useful in many contexts, do
not contribute to the explanation of RP in our experiment. Thus, we provide
support for the, still contested (references given later), reference-dependent gen-
eralizations of decision theories. In particular, we argue that RP provides the
strongest and most clear-cut argument supporting reference dependence together
with the, also still debated, loss aversion. This is extra useful in the face of serious
arguments against loss aversion (Yechiam 2019).
The theoretical debates of RP in the literature suffered from differences in
terminology: (a) Rubinstein (2006) suggested that the term “expected utility”
incorporates reference dependence1; (b) utility of income was used as an alterna-
tive term for reference dependence (see Fig. 1). Wakker (2010 pp. 244-245)
reviewed early debates. Our §8 gives recent references and further details. The
abundance of theoretical debates and semantic confusions have been barriers to
the resolution of RP. Now, 20 years after its appearance, RP has turned into a
classic and its meaning should be settled, both theoretically and empirically. This
is the aim of our paper. We present a theoretical analysis of RP that can disen-
tangle its potential causes, and then the experimental stimuli that allow identifying
its real causes.
Cox et al. (2013), Csvd hereafter, were the first to provide empirical evidence
of the assumed preference patterns in RP. They also showed theoretically when
Rabin’s calibration paradox refutes various reference-independent theories, includ-
ing expected utility. Thus, they were the first to conclusively show that RP is a
genuine violation of expected utility. However, they did not identify the causes of
RP. Our study will do so. We now discuss possible causes.
Rabin (2000) already showed that utility curvature alone cannot completely
explain RP. We, more strongly, do not find any empirical role for utility curvature
in explaining RP. Several authors showed that other deviations from expected
utility, primarily probability weighting, may explain RP theoretically.2 Csvd’s data
did not provide conclusive evidence on probability weighting, and their formal
1 This was stated most clearly in his footnote 5. Rubinstein took expected utility as an abstract mathematical
theory without any empirical commitment, rather than as an economic theory about (rational) human decisions
with financial or other traditional outcomes. Thus, he proposed to use the term expected utility even for the
irrational case of reference-dependent outcomes.
2 References include Barseghyan et al. (2013), Csvd (their §4.1), Neilson (2001), and Wakker (2010 p. 244 5th
paragraph).
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and empirical analyses of RP did not involve reference dependence. In our
experiment, probability weighting, like utility curvature, plays no role in
explaining RP. Neither do other reference-independent deviations from expected
utility. Rabin (2000) conjectured that loss aversion, necessarily involving refer-
ence dependence, is the main cause of his paradox:
Indeed, what is empirically the most firmly established feature of risk
preferences, loss aversion, is a departure from expected-utility theory that
provides a direct explanation for modest-scale risk aversion. Loss aversion
says that people are significantly more averse to losses relative to the status
quo than they are attracted by gains, and more generally that people’s
utilities are determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels.
(p. 1288)
We find that loss aversion is the only cause of RP. Several other authors suggested
loss aversion as an explanation (Csvd p. 307; Lindsay 2013; Park 2016; Wakker
2010 p. 244), but they did not formalize or test this conjecture.3 We do so by
incorporating reference dependence in our theoretical analysis and by carrying out
empirical tests.4 Thus, we resolve the 20-year old RP and show that it is a genuine
deviation from basic normative classical decision principles, providing a strong
argument for the modern behavioral approach.
The paper is organized as follows. Following notation and definitions in §1, §2
presents a theoretical analysis of RP with reference dependence incorporated. Sections
3–5 analyze RP under expected utility, rank-dependent utility, and reference depen-
dence, respectively, stating predictions to falsify the various theories. Section 6 presents
the experiment and its results, with a summary in Table 1. Then follows a discussing of
the experiment (§7) and of related literature (§8), a discussion of reference dependence
(§9), and a conclusion (§10).
1 Notation and definitions
We consider only two-outcome prospects. By αpβ we denote a prospect yielding
outcome α with probability p and outcome β with probability 1 − p. Outcomes are
money amounts. In reference-independent models, outcomes refer to final wealth and
are denoted in bold by Greek letters or real numbers. The initial wealth, which is the
final wealth level when subjects enter the laboratory in our experiment, is denoted 0
(“zero”), as has been customary in classical reference-independent models. It is fixed
throughout the analysis and experiment.
3 Many papers formalize reference dependence in other contexts, e.g., in auction theory, WTP/WTA discrep-
ancies, narrow versus broad bracketing, and numerous other topics. Lindsay (2013) shows that preference
reversals for risk then occur. We will not survey this literature.
4 Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2011) argue that reference dependence is intractable in models of financial
markets. They show that reference-independent probability weighting, as studied by Neilson (2001), can
theoretically accommodate RP by properly restricting the small-scale risk aversion choices and the back-
ground risks assumed. Their footnote 8 points out that the empirical measurement of Neilson’s weighting
function remains as a problem. We will solve this problem.
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By ≽ we denote a preference relation over prospects. Throughout this paper, a utility
function U maps outcomes to the reals. We assume that U is strictly increasing and
continuous. The expected utility (EU) of a prospect αpβ then is
pU αð Þ þ 1−pð ÞU βð Þ: ð1Þ
Expected utility holds if there exists a utility function U such that preferences maximize
EU.
We next define the most general theory considered in this paper, prospect theory
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992), and then specify other theories as special cases.
Prospect theory assumes that for every choice situation subjects perceive a particular
final wealth level as their reference point, which we denote θ. Commonly, the reference
point is the status quo, but it can change within the analysis, for instance due to
different framings. This is the crucial difference between the reference point and initial
wealth, which is fixed throughout the analysis. Under prospect theory, outcomes
describe changes with respect to this variable reference point and are denoted by Greek
letters or real numbers in normal typeface. For example, outcome αθ designates final
wealth α + θ with θ the reference point and α the change. The two different notations
(bold and nonbold) for different kinds of outcomes serve to clarify the ambiguities that
can arise but should be avoided in RP.
A weighting function w maps the probability interval [0, 1] to [0, 1] with w(0) = 0,
w(1) = 1, and w strictly increasing. It does not have to be continuous. A loss aversion
parameter λ is a positive number. Prospect theory (PT) holds if there exist a utility
function u with u(0) = 0, two probability weighting functions w+ and w−, and a loss
aversion parameter λ such that preferences maximize the prospect theory value (PT) of
prospects:
PT αθpβθ
  ¼ wþ pð Þu αð Þ þ 1−wþ pð Þð Þu βð Þ if α≥β≥0; ð2Þ
wþ pð Þu αð Þ þ w− 1−pð Þλu βð Þ if α≥0≥β; ð3Þ
w− pð Þλu αð Þ þ 1−w− pð Þð Þλu βð Þ if 0≥β≥α: ð4Þ
The parameters u, w+, w−, and λ can in principle depend on the reference point θ.
However, they will be stable under small changes of θ, as in our experiment, and we,
therefore, assume that they are independent of θ.5 The loss aversion parameter can be
incorporated into utility by writing
U αð Þ ¼ u αð Þ for α ≥ 0 and U βð Þ ¼ λu βð Þ for β≤0; ð5Þ
5 Kahneman and Tversky (1979 pp. 277-278) wrote “However, the preference order of prospects is not greatly
altered by small or even moderate variations in asset position.… Consequently, the representation of value as
a function in one argument generally provides a satisfactory approximation.”
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U will typically have a kink at 0. We usually denote the reference point as a subscript of
the preference symbol rather than of the outcomes. If the reference point θ has been
specified, we may therefore write α instead of αθ. Utility of income is the special case
where there is no probability weighting, i.e., w+(p) =w−(p) = p. It generalizes expected
utility by incorporating reference dependence, and has expected utility as the special
case where the reference point is fixed.
We now turn to reference-independent special cases of PT. The first special case we
consider is rank-dependent utility (RDU). It assumes w+(p) = 1 −w−(1 − p) =w(p) and
λ = 1 (so that u = U). The main restriction is that RDU assumes reference
independence: outcomes are described in terms of final wealth. This can be
formalized by assuming that the reference point θ is fixed at 0.6 We get
RDU αpβ
  ¼ w pð ÞU αð Þ þ 1−w pð Þð ÞU βð Þ if α≥β ð6Þ
Probability weighting under RDU is sign-independent. For gains we have w(p) =w+(p)
but for losses we have a dual w(p) = 1 −w−(1 − p). EU is the special case of RDU where
w+(p) =w−(p) =w(p) = p.
For two-outcome prospects as used in our experiment, nearly all existing reference-
and sign-independent nonexpected utility theories are special cases of RDU and,
consequently, of PT (Wakker 2010 §7.11). Such theories include the reference-
independent version of original prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and
disappointment aversion theory (Gul 1991). Hence, the analysis of this paper concerns
all transitive risk theories that are popular today.
2 The preferences in Rabin’s paradox: Reference-dependent versus
reference-independent modeling
The formalization of reference dependence defined in the previous section has been
used in many contexts, but not yet to analyze RP. This section shows how this
formalization allows us to identify and isolate potential causes of the paradox. The
subtle distinctions between reference points, initial wealth, final wealth, and changes of
wealth call for careful notation, but once this is settled the RP can readily be resolved.
Fig. 1 gives a comprehensive account. Given the subtle distinctions, with five choices
playing a role, the figure cannot be very simple. In return, it gives a complete picture of
all relevant issues. The various panels will be explained next.
Rabin assumed that people reject a 50–50 prospect of winning 11 or losing 10 (Fig. 1a:
basic (final-wealth) preference). With the natural status quo of 0, this assumption is
empirically plausible for different subjects at different wealth levels; that is, in a “be-
tween”-subject sense. It then is also plausible in a “within”-subject sense, i.e., for one
subject at different wealth levels. For instance, if for a given subject in our experiment, the
basic preference holds for most subjects €11 richer than her, then it will probably also hold
for her if she were €11 richer. We call this argument the between-within argument. It
6 Alternatively, it can be formalized by assuming that preferences and, accordingly, the components of the
preference functional depend on outcomes αθ only through the final wealth α + θ. Yet another way to interpret
RDU as a special case of PT is to assume θ = −∞, in other words, to assume that all outcomes are gains.
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makes Rabin’s claims plausible for various wealth levels within one individual while
avoiding the experimental problem of implementing large wealth changes. Under expect-
ed utility, the argument implies the wealth-change preferences in Fig. 1b for a range of
wealth levels ω. Csvd’s experiment covered the rangeω ∈ [−100, 100000].
Figures 1a and 1b, above the bold dashed line, contain reference-independent
presentations. Reference-dependent presentations are below the bold dashed line, in
Figs. 1c, 1d1, and 1d2, with reference points specified as subscripts of preferences.
Fig. 1c presents the basic reference-dependent preference, with reference point 0. The
reference-change preference of Fig. 1d1 is then plausible for the various reference
points ω concerned, say all ω ∈ [−100, 100000], the wealth levels considered by Csvd.
We will discuss later whether the outcome-change preference (Fig. 1d2) is plausible.
EU, like all other reference-independent theories, does not distinguish between
reference-change preference and outcome-change preference (Figs. 1d1 and 1d2),
equating them also with the wealth-change preference in Fig. 1b. The brace below
these three figures indicates this equivalence. It explains EU’s “between-within” move
from the basic preference to the wealth-change preference. This move leads, via the
equivalence between Fig.1d1 and 1d2, to highly risk averse preferences that cannot be
accommodated by EU. This is the RP for EU.
Fig. 1 The preferences in Rabin’s paradox
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Many theoretical explanations of RP have been suggested in the literature. Maintaining
reference independence, one potential cause of the paradox is that both utility curvature
and probability weighting contribute to risk aversion (for instance under RDU). Other
theories, such as prospect theory, allow for reference dependence as a potential cause.
Then the empirically plausible Fig. 1d1 does not imply Fig. 1d2, and, consequently, the
empirically plausible Fig. 1a and the implausible Fig.1b are no longer linked.
To identify the causes of RP, it is crucial to model the wealth-change preference (Fig.
1d1) and the reference-change preference (Fig. 1d2) separately, and to compare the
degree of risk aversion in these two decision situations. For example, if the risk
aversion of Fig. 1a mainly shows up in Fig.1d1 and less so in Fig. 1d2, then reference
dependence and loss aversion are the main causes of RP. In other cases, reference-
independent deviations from expected utility, primarily probability weighting, are the
main causes. If there is no significant risk aversion in Fig. 1d2, then probability
weighting and other reference-independent causes are unimportant and utility of
income suffices to explain RP. As emphasized by Buchak (2014 footnote 6), even
though Rabin (2000) did not formally distinguish Figs. 1d1 and 1d2, he was careful to
always choose framings consistent with Fig. 1d1 and never with Fig. 1d2. We will
indeed find that the problem with expected utility is the transition from Fig. 1d1 to 1d2.
We used a brace below Figs. 1a and 1c to indicate that reference-independent
theories do not distinguish between these two figures, similarly as they do not distin-
guish between Figs. 1b, 1d1, and 1d2. In particular, background risks will not play a
significant role if they are incorporated into the reference point ω as in Fig. 1d1 rather
than in the outcomes as in Fig. 1d2. The impossibility to distinguish between figures
above one brace has hampered the debates in the literature using reference-independent
theories, as for instance in Harrison et al. (2017).
3 Rabin’s paradox as a violation of expected utility
Because framing is central to the resolution of RP, we discuss the different frames that
constitute our experimental stimuli jointly with our theoretical analyses. We use the
framing in Fig. 2 to test Rabin’s basic preference (110.5(−10) ≼ 0 in Fig. 1a and
110.5(−10)≼00 in Fig. 1c). We use an accept-reject (“Yes-No”) formulation because
empirical evidence suggests that this leads to most reference dependence and loss
aversion (Ert and Erev 2013), and, therefore, gives the strongest possible test of
classical theories. Our prediction, in agreement with common views on risk attitudes
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992) and Csvd’s findings, is:
Prediction 1 A large majority of the subjects will reject (choose “no”) in Fig. 2.
Implication Expected utility with concave utility is falsified.
Explanation As explained in §2, if the prediction holds true, then the preferences in
Fig. 1d1 (110.5(−10)≼ω0) are also plausible. Under expected utility, the preferences in
Fig. 1b ((ω + 11)0.5(ω − 10) ≼ ω) then hold. They imply U(ω + 11) −U(ω) ≤U(ω) −
U(ω − 10). Hence, the average marginal utility U′ over [ω,ω + 11] is at most 10/11
times that over [ω − 10,ω]. For concave utility, it implies that U′ falls by a factor of at
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least 10/11 over every interval [ω − 10,ω + 11] of length 21. This is too fast to be
reasonable. For example, for every α, no matter how big, it would imply rejection of
the prospect α0.5(−100) if the wealth-change preferences (Fig. 1b) hold for all
ω ∈ [−100,α] (Rabin 2000 p. 1282). This is absurd and, hence, entails a violation of
expected utility. We need factors other than utility curvature to explain the rejection in
Fig. 2. □.
4 Nonexpected utility theories as failed attempts to preserve reference
independence
The main attempts to save reference independence from RP are based on proba-
bility weighting, the other deviation from expected utility modelled by prospect
theory. That is, RDU was used to explain RP. RDU, like EU, does not distinguish
between reference-change (110.5(−10)≼ω0; Fig. 1d1) and outcome-change ((11 +
ω)0.5(−10 + ω)≼0ω; Fig. 1d2) preferences. Consequently, the basic preference
(110.5(−10) ≽ 0; Fig. 1a) implies the wealth-change preferences ((ω + 11)0.5(ω −
10) ≽ ω; Fig. 1b) as it does under EU. Barberis et al. (2006), Barseghyan et al.
(2013), Csvd (their §4.1), Neilson (2001), and Wakker (2010 p. 244 5th paragraph)
pointed out that RDU can—in theory—accommodate the final-wealth preferences
(Figs. 1a and 1b).7 For example, a moderate underweighting of p = 0.5, with
w 0:5ð Þ < 10
21
¼ 0:476;
suffices to accommodate these preferences even when utility is linear. Concave
utility reinforces the preferences. Empirical studies have typically found an aver-
age of w(0.5) < 0.476 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Fox et al. 2015), supporting
this explanation.8 To explore it in more detail, we will test RDU by measuring
7 Freeman (2015) showed that this can continue to hold if background risks are incorporated.
8 Even for the most extreme case in Csvd discussed in their §4 (the second Indian group), strong probability
weighting could in theory still explain the observed risk aversion. Our empirical measurements will rule out
this theoretical possibility though.
Fig. 2 Presentation of basic preference (Fig. 1a) to subjects
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probability weighting.
Safra and Segal (2008) give a theoretical treatment of RP using RDU, but with assump-
tions that are not empirically plausible. They assume independence of background risks
(implicitly identifying Figs. 1b and 1d1) to argue that probability weighting cannot explain
RP.Wakker (2010) argued that Safra and Segal’s independence assumption is restrictive and
empirically implausible. His criticism is supported by Barberis et al. (2006), who showed
that the independence assumption by itself already rules out probability weighting.
In a theoretical contribution, Neilson (2001) suggested the following extension of
RP that would falsify RDU. We test this falsification empirically. Crucial for Rabin’s
calibration in §2 is that the weight of the gain 11 is the same as the weight of the loss
−10. To achieve these equal weights under RDU, for each subject we measured the
probability r such that
w rð Þ ¼ 0:5: ð7Þ
Details are in the Appendix. Based on existing empirical evidence (Fehr-Duda and
Epper 2012; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker 2010 §9.5), we predict:
Prediction 2 The average r in Eq. 7 will exceed 0.5 considerably, entailing considerable
risk aversion. □.
We then offered the prospect 11r(−10) to each subject, where r was their individual
value measured in Eq. 7. This gives the desired equal weighting of outcomes under
RDU.9 The offered prospect was more favorable than Rabin’s prospect if r > 0.5, which
was the typical case. Fig. 3 displays the framing used for a subject with r = 0.63. The
crucial point here is to use a framing that induces the right reference point and loss
aversion. For this purpose, we again use the accept-reject framing. Hence, we have:
Prediction 3 A majority of subjects will reject (choose “No”) in Fig. 3.
Implication RDU cannot explain Rabin’s Paradox.
Explanation Under RDU with linear or slightly concave utility, subjects should accept
the prospect offered, contrary to Prediction 3. This shows that RDU’s correction for
probability weighting does not remove all risk aversion. Neilson (2001) showed that
utility curvature cannot explain the remaining risk aversion by deriving utility calibra-
tion paradoxes for RDU.10 There must be factors beyond RDU that explain RP. □
On our domain of two-outcome prospects, nearly all reference-independent
nonexpected utility theories agree with RDU (see end of §1). Hence, none of those
other theories can explain RP either. We therefore turn to reference-dependent theories
in the next section, where we will also allow probability weighting to be different for
gains and losses, as in prospect theory. Our experiment will later find that probability
weighting plays no empirical role in RP.
9 The condition in Footnote 14 of Csvd is now satisfied and, according to their Corollary 1.1, calibration
implications for utility are possible.
10 Our choice of r rules out the theoretical possibility discussed in §2 for the second Indian group in Csvd (that
strong probability weighting could still explain the risk aversion).
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To avoid misunderstandings, we emphasize that our study does not claim that
probability weighting would be unimportant. Many studies have demonstrated its
importance (Barseghyan et al. 2013; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012; Qiu and Steiger
2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Viscusi 1995 p. 107; Wakker 2010). In particular,
it can accommodate strong risk aversion for small stakes through first-order risk
aversion. We claim only that probability weighting played no role in the particular
choices in RP. To further illustrate our point, consider an alternative paradox, similar to
RP and with similar calibration implications for utility. It could be constructed if
subjects had preferences 210.50 ≼ 10 at all or many wealth levels, while perceiving all
outcomes as gains. Then loss aversion could play no role and probability weighting
would drive the paradox. We will in fact test this preference later (Fig. 5b) and find that
it may exist, but is considerably weaker than the classical RP. Our findings regarding
probability weighting only serve as an intermediate step in what is our main and
positive purpose: to show the importance of reference dependence.
5 Reference-dependent theories can explain Rabin’s paradox
Many studies have confirmed reference and sign dependence, entailing violations of RDU
(Huber et al. 2008; Wakker 2010 §9.5), although it continues to be debated (Isoni et al.
2011; Plott and Zeiler 2005; Yechiam 2019). We will analyze these concepts in their most
basic and clearest form, using rank-dependent prospect theory where the reference point
describes a deterministic wealth level (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Other models are
discussed in §8.
Sign dependence means that risk attitudes differ for losses and gains. Whereas prob-
ability weighting is mostly pessimistic for gains, with prevailing underweighting of
favorable outcomes, for losses the opposite holds, with prevailing optimism and
underweighting of unfavorable outcomes (Chesson and Viscusi 2003 Table III; Wakker
2010 §9.5). This reflection falsifies RDU. It also implies that the correction for probability
weighting under RDU in Fig. 3 is not correct. To obtain Rabin’s calibration argument for
utility, which involves the same decision weights for the two outcomes, we should,
according to prospect theory (Eq. 4), measure for each subject the probability p such that
Fig 3 Basic preference with r =0.63 instead of 0.50
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wþ pð Þ ¼ w− 1−pð Þ: ð8Þ
Our measurement of p is similar to Abdellaoui et al. (2016). Details are in the
Appendix. Because RDU is a special case of prospect theory, it predicts p = r. Under
RDU, Eq. 8 provides an alternative way to find the probability r (=p) of Eq. 7.
However, based on the common findings of reflection we predict:
Prediction 4 0.5 ≈ p < r. □
We offered the prospect 11p(−10) to subjects. Fig. 4 displays this offer for a subject
with p = 0.52. It is natural to assume that the reference point is the status quo for this
choice.
Given Prediction 1 concerning the same choice but with probability 0.5 and given
Prediction 4, we have:
Prediction 5 A large majority of subjects, as in Fig. 2 (Prediction 1), will reject (choose
“No”) in Fig. 4.
Implication Probability weighting does not contribute to the explanation of RP. Be-
cause p ≈ 0.5, probability weighting does not capture any risk aversion in RP. After
properly correcting for probability weighting (Fig. 4), the same unexplained risk
aversion remains as before (Fig. 2). □.
Under prospect theory, the above prediction gives indirect support for reference
dependence, because it is the only explanation left for RP, given that utility curvature
and probability weighting have been ruled out (and also other nonexpected utilities; see
the end of §1). Loss aversion λ is commonly found to be about 2, although there is much
variation (Ert and Erev 2013; Abdellaoui and Kemel 2014, §5.1;Wakker 2010 §9.5). Loss
aversion thus leads to strong risk aversion and can readily explain the preference in Fig. 3
and the strong preferences in Figs. 2 and 4 for any plausible probability weighting and
utility curvature. Apart from prospect theory, transitive deviations from expected utility
proposed in the literature usually have not considered sign dependence. For our stimuli
they mostly agree with RDU and they also make Prediction 3.
Fig. 4 Basic preference with p =0.52 instead of 0.50
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To obtain direct support for reference dependence, we tested the reference-change and
outcome-change preferences. In Fig. 5b, the outcome-change preference cannot be
formulated as an accept-reject decision and was formulated as a binary choice. To have
a clean test of reference dependence, we therefore also framed the reference-change
question in Fig. 5a as a binary choice. This change in framing will probably reduce loss
aversion and, consequently, risk aversion somewhat. To make the framings and proce-
dures as similar as possible, we also added the prior endowment of €1 in Fig. 5b, which by
normative standards should be negligible. Finally, we used the probabilities p of Eq. 8
instead of 0.5 to control for probability weighting and focus on reference dependence. By
Prediction 4, these probabilities p will not have a systematic effect on risk aversion and
Figs. 5a and 5b also test Figs. 1d1 (110.5(−10)≼ω0) versus 1d2 ((11 +ω)0.5(−10 +ω)≼0ω).
Figures 5a and 5b differ only in the way that final outcomes are split into reference
point and change with respect to the reference point. Our analysis is based on the
assumption that: (a) the reference point in Fig. 5a has the additional payment incorpo-
rated; (b) accordingly, the outcome −€10 in Fig. 5a is perceived as a loss; (c) in Fig. 5b,
the status quo of €0 is the reference point so that no losses are perceived. This is the
most common assumption for reference points and for their implementation in exper-
iments (Bateman et al. 2005; de Martino et al. 2006; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; Kühberger
1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). It is crucial for the common incentivization of
losses with prior endowments, and for endowment effects underlying WTP-WTA
discrepancies (Sayman and Öncüler 2005; Viscusi and Huber 2012).
In the CPE model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), future expectations serve as
reference points if choices have been anticipated sufficiently far ahead in time, but
not if they come as a surprise. In our experiment, subjects did not know beforehand
what the choices would be, or the dynamic development of reference points. Our
assumption will, probably, not hold for all subjects, and several subjects may perceive
various other reference points, such as the sure outcome €10 depicted in Fig. 5b. It
suffices that our assumption holds for most subjects.
In Fig. 5b, loss aversion does not play a role for most subjects and, therefore, risk
aversion will be lower even though it will probably still exist owing to pessimistic
probability weighting for gains.11 Most subjects will take Fig. 5a as Fig. 1d1
(110.5(−10)≼ω0), and they will be as strongly risk averse as in the basic preferences in
Fig. 2. Some subjects will integrate payments and take Fig. 5a as Fig. 1d2 ((11 +
ω)0.5(−10 + ω)≼0ω), which reduces risk aversion. We summarize our claims:
Prediction 6 A majority of subjects will reject (choose the sure Prospect B) in Figs. 5a
and 5b, but fewer than in Fig. 2, and the fewest in Fig. 5b.
Implication A difference in risk aversion between Figs. 5a and 5b falsifies reference
independence. □.
11 The probability used in Fig. 5b, resulting from Eq. 8, was on average very close to 0.5. If the outcomes in
Fig. 5b are perceived as gains, this probability will be weighted in a risk averse way, as our measurement of r
demonstrates.
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6 Our experimental findings
Subjects N = 77 students (29 female; average age 22 years) from Erasmus University
Rotterdam participated, in four sessions. Most were finance bachelor students.
Incentives Each subject received a €10 participation fee. In addition, we randomly (by a
bingo machine) selected two subjects in each session who could play out one of their
randomly selected choices (which includes those to elicit r and p; see the appendix) for
real. The selections were implemented in front of all subjects in a session by a volunteer.
Baltussen et al. (2012) validated such incentive schemes. Subjects were paid immediately
after the experiment. Losses could never exceed €10 and were paid from the showup fee.
This way of implementing losses is common in experimental economics. The experiment
lasted about 45 minutes and the average payment per subject was €15.70.
Procedure The experiment was computer-run. Subjects sat in cubicles to avoid inter-
actions. They could ask questions at any time during the experiment. Training questions
familiarized subjects with the stimuli. Subjects could only start after they had correctly
answered two comprehension questions.
Fig 5 A direct test of reference dependence (with p =0.52 instead of 0.50).
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Stimuli Probabilities were generated by throwing two 10-sided dice. Details are in the
Online Appendix.12 We first measured the probability r (Eq. 7). Then we asked the two
accept-reject questions of Figs. 2 and 3, followed by the measurement of p (Eq. 8). We,
finally, asked the accept-reject question of Fig. 4 and the two questions of Figs. 5a and
5b, with the order of these three questions counterbalanced.
Results Statistical tests, all two-sided, confirmed our predictions. Table 1 summarizes
some results.
Prediction 1 [basic preference]: 88% rejected (“No”) the prospect in Fig. 2 (p value
<0.001; binomial test).
Prediction 2: [r > 0.5]: The mean and median r were 0.63 > 0.5 (p value <0.001;
Wilcoxon test).
As a byproduct of the measurement of r, we also measured utility (see the
Appendix). We found linear utility, which is plausible for the moderate amounts in
our experiment. Thus, whereas Implication 1 shows that utility curvature cannot
entirely explain RP, we do not find any contribution of utility to the explanation of RP.
Prediction 3 [basic preference with RDU probability weighting]: 74% rejected the
prospect in Fig. 3 (p value <0.001; Binomial test). This percentage is smaller than in
Fig. 2 (p value = 0.015; McNemar test).
Prediction 4 [0.5 ≈ p < r]: The mean p was 0.52 and the median was 0.48. H0: p = 0.5
is not rejected (p value = 0.4; Wilcoxon test). p < r is confirmed (p value <0.001;
Wilcoxon test).
When measuring p, as a byproduct we also measured loss aversion. It was approx-
imately 2 (see the Appendix), in agreement with previous findings in the literature and
well suited to explain RP.
Prediction 5 [basic preference with PT probability weighting]: 87% rejected the
prospect shown in Fig. 4 (p value <0.001; binomial test). This was not significantly
different from Fig. 2 (p value = 1; McNemar test).
Prediction 6 [reference- versus outcome-change preference]: 78% rejected the pros-
pect in Fig. 5a (p value <0.001; binomial test), and 62% rejected the prospect in Fig. 5b
(p value = 0.08; binomial test). The latter is smaller than the former (p value = 0.04;
McNemar test).
The findings of Figs. 5a and 5b (Prediction 6) provide a direct within-subject
falsification of reference independence.
12 See http://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdfspubld/20.1rabinresolved_onl.appdix.pdf.
Table 1 Summary of our findings
Fig. 2 (& §6)
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Treatment
Basic
RDU-r
PT-p
a: Ref. change
b: Outcome change
88%
% Safe
74%
87%
78%
62%
Contribution to explaining RP
EU rejected: U does not explain anything of RP
(incorrect) RDU- does not explain all of RP
(correct) PT- does not explain anything of RP
Reference dependence explains RP
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7 Discussion of experimental details
Our experiment involved some adaptive (chained) stimuli, where answers given to
some questions affected later stimuli, for instance regarding the probabilities r and p in
Figs. 3 and 4. It was practically impossible for subjects to see through this procedure
and to work out if and how manipulation could be beneficial. Hence, manipulation is,
in the terminology of Bardsley et al. (2010 pp. 265, 285), a theoretical possibility but it
is practically impossible. In practice, it does not affect incentive compatibility in our
experiment.
Counterbalancing is commonly used to avoid order effects, but it can complicate the
design for subjects and the subsequent analyses, and it can increase noise. It is,
therefore, used only to avoid the major risks of order effects. In our study, this is
particularly important because showing multiple different lotteries may affect the
reference point that subjects select. We felt that Figs. 5a and 5b were most vulnerable
to this problem and we, therefore, counterbalanced their presentation, combined with
Fig. 4. For the other stimuli, we saw no reason to expect biases due to order effects, and
we did not counterbalance them.
We could have avoided some order effects by using a between-subject design
instead of a within-subject design. The pros and cons of these two designs are well-
known (Ballinger and Wilcox 1997; Camerer 1989 p. 85). A between-subject design
avoids order effects, but a within-subject design gives more statistical power, can test
more hypotheses, and gives cleaner tests. The latter points are particularly relevant for
our corrections for probability weighting. Further, a between-subject design had prac-
tical difficulties. Embedding it in sessions with other experiments might lead to
spillover effects similar to the order effects that we sought to avoid. Implementing it
in isolation would lead to very short experiments and subject’s implied payoff per hour
would have substantially exceeded the upper bound imposed in our lab to avoid
negative externalities for other experiments.
8 Preceding literature
Samuelson (1963) preceded Rabin in providing a paradox for expected utility where
risk aversion in the small implies unreasonable risk aversion in the large. Samuelson
assumed rejection of one prospect 2000.5(−100). If this preference holds at all wealth
levels (as implied by constant absolute risk aversion), then it follows that 100 inde-
pendent repetitions of this prospect should also be rejected. However, by the law of
large numbers the latter preference is questionable. Edwards (1954 p. 401) presented a
similar paradox. RP is stronger because from weaker and more convincing assumptions
it derives stronger and more absurd conclusions. Hansson (1988) presented the same
basic phenomenon as Rabin; it was perfected by Rabin.
Wakker (2010 pp. 244-245) surveyed early discussions of RP. Since then,
Johansson-Stenman (2010) presented a theoretical analysis of RP for life-time con-
sumption, Barseghyan et al. (2013 pp. 2526-2527) discussed an explanation based on
probability weighting, Golman and Loewenstein (2016) suggested a cognitive model to
explain it, and Sydnor (2010) provided field evidence, from insurance markets,
supporting Rabin’s empirical claims. Schechter (2007) measured risk attitudes of
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farmers in Paraguay, where information about initial and final wealth was available.
Her findings supported the reference-dependent evaluation of Fig. 1d1 (110.5(−10)≼ω0)
rather than the integrated evaluation of Fig. 1d2 ((11 + ω)0.5(−10 + ω)≼0ω), which she
referred to as evidence for narrow bracketing (Rabin and Thaler 2001). In our context,
narrow bracketing is equivalent to reference dependence, and our study can be
interpreted as supporting the importance of narrow bracketing.
Sarver (2018) presented a general class of all preference functionals satisfying a
convexity condition w.r.t. probabilistic mixing. This class contains functionals that are
nonkinked, but close enough to kinked, to accommodate RP. He points out that the
RDU functional, a special case of his general class, may still be best suited to
accommodate RP (p. 1367 first paragraph). He also discusses background risks, which
we discussed at the end of §2.
The rest of this section discusses the closely related paper of Csvd. Csvd investi-
gated RP systematically, following up on their theoretical analysis in Cox and Sadiraj
(2006). Csvd were the first to confirm RP empirically and to establish it as another
falsification of expected utility. They also provided a detailed theoretical analysis under
RDU (their Eq. NL-1), with probability weighting as the deviation from EU. Outcomes
were taken reference independent, in terms of final wealth; i.e., they were changes w.r.t.
the wealth level upon entering the lab. Csvd pointed out that RDU is a special case of
prospect theory (fixed reference point; sign-independent probability weighting), so that
this special case of PT is also covered by their analysis.
Csvd provided theorems that exactly identify the utility functions and probability
weighting functions that lead to Rabin’s calibration paradoxes under RDU for various
potential empirical preferences. We followed up on their results. In particular, we
measured and corrected for probability weighting in RDU to find out to what extent
it accommodates RP empirically.
In their experiments, Csvd used large outcomes, incentivized through an arrange-
ment with a casino with small but positive probabilities of actual implementation. For
41 German students they found majority preferences
ωþ 110ð Þ0:5 ω−100ð Þ≼ω
for ω = 3K, 9K, 50K, 70K, 90K, and 110K with K = 1000 and Euro as unit. For 30
Indian students they found majority preferences
ωþ 30ð Þ0:5 ω−20ð Þ≼ω
for ω = 100, 1K, 2K, 4K, 5K, and 6K with rupee as unit (50 rupees is a one-day salary
for the students). Finally, for another group of 40 Indian students they found majority
preferences
ωþ 90ð Þ0:5 ω−50ð Þ≼ω
for ω = 50, 800, 1.7K, 2.7K, 3.8K, and 5K. Thus, they confirmed preferences as in
Fig. 1d2 ((11 + ω)0.5(−10 + ω)≼0ω) for a wide enough range of wealth levels to imply
RP for expected utility and thus establish it as a genuine empirical violation.
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The implications of Csvd’s findings for probability weighting are not entirely clear.
Their Corollary 1.113 shows that RDU with nonlinear probability weighting and linear
utility can accommodate their findings, and does not lead to calibration paradoxes, if
w(0.5) ≤ 10/21 for the German students,w(0.5) ≤ 2/5 for the first group of Indian students,
and w(0.5) ≤ 5/14 for the second group of Indian students. To avoid misunderstandings,
note that these upper bounds on w(0.5) can be relaxed somewhat under concave utility,
offering extra protection against probability calibration paradoxes. Thus, theories that
transform both probabilities and outcomes are less prone to calibration problems than
theories that transform only one of these two.
Probability weighting is least plausible for the second Indian group of Csvd (requir-
ing w(0.5) ≤ 5/14). However, it cannot be ruled out without further information about
this particular group of subjects, and actual measurement of w is desirable to settle the
case. This is why we measured and fully corrected for probability weighting in our
experiment. Csvd did not formalize or test reference dependence with loss aversion, but
suggested it as an explanation of the problems of probability weighting.14
Interestingly, Csvd also tested a dual version of RP, introduced by Sadiraj (2014), in
which calibration paradoxes are the result of probability weighting rather than of
utility.15 Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) consider other variations revealing further
problems. We will not review extensions of Rabin’s paradox, but focus on Rabin’s
original paradox. As we showed, this already gives clear conclusions for decision
theory, namely that reference dependence is desirable for descriptive theories. Many
other findings further demonstrated the importance of reference- and sign dependence,
factors beyond probability weighting.16
Summarizing, Csvd were the first to conclusively demonstrate that RP falsifies expect-
ed utility. They suggested that probability weighting and reference dependence may
accommodate these violations, but the evidence they provided was not conclusive. They
strongly suggested that probability weighting alone cannot tell the whole story. In their
introduction, they raised the general question: “Is there a plausible theory for decision
under risk?” As we have shown, the main message from RP is that reference dependence
is an important part of the answer to this general question. As regards normative
implications, there is wide, though not universal, agreement that reference
dependence—taken as a framing effect—is irrational, and that it is more irrational than
probability weighting. Probability weighting only violates the von Neumann-Morgenstern
independence axiom as in Allais’ paradox. Allais and many others saw such violations as
13 Footnote 14 in the proof in their paper points out that, to obtain calibration paradoxes, the weighting-
corrected expected value (expected value after replacing p = 0.5 by p =w(0.5)) of the risky option should
exceed that of the safe option.
14 Their §4.2 excludes variable reference points for their dual paradox, but we focus on Rabin’s original
paradox.
15 As pointed out by Csvd (§4.2), changing reference points play no role for this dual paradox, unlike for the
original one. But sign-dependence and loss aversion still do. Csvd’s Corollary 2.1 shows that, for linear utility
and probability weighting, calibration paradoxes can be avoided if λ ≥ 3 for German students, λ ≥ 3 for one
American sample, λ ≥ 14/4 for another American sample, and λ ≥ 5 for an Indian sample. (In their Corollary
2.2, Csvd do not formalize loss aversion separately but let it be part of their loss utility function μ. That is, their
μ is ourU in Eq. 5.) Under pessimistic probability weighting and concave utility, the upper bounds on λ can be
relaxed. Again, theories that transform both probabilities and outcomes are more immune to calibration
problems than theories that transform only one of these.
16 Recent papers from this journal include Abdellaoui et al. (2018), Chao et al. (2017), Oliver (2018), Pahlke
et al. (2015), and Viscusi and Masterman (2017).
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rational. Consequently, RP provides a more serious deviation from classical rationality
assumptions than previously thought.
9 Discussion of reference dependence
Andersen et al. (2018) examined the dependence of risk aversion (as in Fig. 1d1) on
wealth, using individual data on wealth from Denmark. They assumed a homogenous
agent and then used between-subject comparisons. They found a weak relation between
risk aversion and wealth. The authors interpreted wealth levels as reference points, and
their finding as reference dependence. However, they could not distinguish between
(analogs of) Figs. 1d1 and 1d2; i.e., between reference dependence and outcome
dependence. They have no test analogous to our Fig. 5. Therefore, their finding can
also be taken as a weak deviation from constant absolute risk aversion in a final wealth
model.
Markowitz (1952) was among the first to propose reference dependence, but he did
not incorporate probability weighting and made empirically invalid conjectures about
utility curvature. Other early works include Shackle (1949 Ch. 2) on sign dependence
and Edwards (1954 p. 395 & p. 405). Edwards later influenced the young Tversky.
Arrow (1951 p. 432) discussed reference dependence, pointing out that it plays no role
when outcomes refer to final wealth, and criticizing it for this reason. An early
appearance of loss aversion is in Robertson (1915 p. 135).
Prospect theory was the first reference-dependent theory that could work empirically. It
still is, today, the most widely tested and best confirmed theory of decision under risk.
Many different andmore advanced reference-dependent models (Apesteguia andBallester
2009; Köszegi and Rabin 2006; Masatlioglu and Raymond 2016; Schmidt 2003; Schmidt
et al. 2008) and definitions of loss aversion (Abdellaoui et al. 2007, Table 1; Peeters and
Czapinski 1990; Köbberling and Wakker 2005; Peters 2012; Schmidt and Zank 2005)
have been proposed since, that can also be applied in complex andmore general situations.
They are not needed for the relatively simple RP choices and our empirical tests. Further,
in the alternative models, utility curvature, probability weighting, and loss aversion are
often not clearly separated. In particular, the best-known alternative model (Köszegi and
Rabin 2006) has not yet been extended to allow for probability weighting.
We leave detailed analyses of RP using alternative models to future studies. We have
used prospect theory, the earliest, simplest, and most extensively tested reference-
dependent model, and, as we have shown, it leads to clear conclusions. Whereas
reference-dependent theoretical models, and experimental stimuli to detect reference
dependence, have been used before, our novelty lies in combining the two in a way that
resolves RP.
10 Conclusion
Rabin’s (2000) paradox is one of the most famous paradoxes in modern economics. It is
commonly, although not universally, accepted as negative evidence against classical
expected utility (Kahneman 2003 p. 164). Its cause had not yet been identified, so that
no positive inference could be derived. We identify this cause and provide a positive
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inference: RP proves that we need reference-dependent generalizations of classical
models, and it does so more strongly than any other paradox did before. Other
deviations from expected utility do not contribute to explaining Rabin’s paradox.
Appendix
Measurement of r and P
We derived all indifferences in our experiment from choices through bisection proce-
dures (Online Appendix). To measure the probability r in Eq. 7 and obtain an estimate
of utility curvature, we iteratively elicited four indifferences, xi0:5g∼xi−10:5G (i = 1, …,
4), where we chose g = 3, G = 16, and x0 = 25. Fig 6 displays a choice used to elicit x1.
From the indifferences xi0:5g∼xi−10:5G we obtain, by RDU,
U xið Þ−U xi−1ð Þ ¼ 1−w 0:5ð Þð Þ U Gð Þ−U gð Þð Þw 0:5ð Þ
for all i, so that the xi’s are equally spaced in utility units. We next elicited probabilities
ri such that
xiþ1ri xi−1∼xi
for i = 1, 2, 3. By RDU, w(ri) = 0.5 for all i. In our case, propagation of errors in the xi’s
plays no role here because all that matters is that xi + 1 is properly placed relative to xi − 1
and xi. The three average values of r are 0.67, 0.58, and 0.63. By a Friedman test their
differences are significant (p value = 0.045), which can be taken as a rejection of RDU.
For r we took the average of these three ri.
To measure p of Eq. 8, and obtain an estimate of loss aversion, we first chose a value
L = − 10. We then measured the bold variables in the following four indifferences
G0.5L~0, x+~G0.50, 00.5L~x−, and x+px−~0.
51 - 1001 - 50
€16€25
51 - 1001 - 50
€3€57
Which prospect do you prefer? 
Prospect A
Prospect B
Fig 6 A choice to elicit x1
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Substituting PT, the indifferences imply PT(G0.50) = − PT(00.5L), U(x+) = −U(x−),
and, finally, the required Eq. 8 for p. Table 2 displays summary statistics.
The values of xi (i = 1,…, 4) suggest almost linear utility for gains: the distances xi +
1 − xi (i = 1,…, 3) are not significantly different (Friedman test, p = 0.38). Under the
plausible assumption of piecewise linear utility for small stakes with only a kink at 0
reflecting loss aversion, the mean ratio x
þ
x− ¼ 2:71 and the median ratio x
þ
x− ¼ 2:25
further support the presence of loss aversion.
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